UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Not Reported

Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

8-1-2013

Beighley v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40319

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported
Recommended Citation
"Beighley v. State Respondent's Brief Dckt. 40319" (2013). Not Reported. 1088.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/not_reported/1088

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Not Reported by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please
contact annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
WENDY BEIGHLEY,

)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner-Appellant,

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

No. 40319
Teton Co. Case No.
CV-2011-370

)
)

Respondent.

)

__________ )

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL
DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE
COUNTY OF TETON

HONORABLE DARREN B. SIMPSON
District Judge

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
PAUL R. PANTHER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division

SPENCER J. HAHN
Deputy State Appellate
Public Defender
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, Idaho 83703
(208) 334-2712

DAPHNE J. HUANG
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 O
(208) 334-4534
ATTORNEYS FOR
RESPONDENT

ATTORNEY FOR
PETITIONER-APPELLA~T

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .............................................................................. ii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................... 1
Nature of the Case ................................................................................ 1
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings ................................... 1
ISSUES ........................................................................................................... 2
ARGUMENT .................................................................................................... 3

Beighley Has Failed To Show The District Court
Erred In Summarily Dismissing Her Petition For
Post-Conviction Relief........................................................................... 3
A.

Introduction ................................................................................ 3

B.

Standard Of Review ................................................................... 3

C.

Beighley's Petition Failed To State A Genuine
Issue Of Material Fact ................................................................ 3
1.

Beighley's Petition Failed To State A
Genuine Issue Of Material Fact.. .................................... .4

2.

Beighley Failed To Allege Facts Demonstrating
She Was Entitled To The Relief Requested .................... 5

CONCLUSION ................................................................................................. 8
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .......................................................................... 8

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 973 P.2d 749 (Ct. App. 1999) .................... 3
Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 180 P.3d 521 (Ct. App. 2009) .............................. 6
Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 727 P.2d 1279 (Ct. App. 1986) .... 3
Ferrierv. State, 135 Idaho 797, 25 P.3d 110 (2001) ........................................... .4
Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770 (2011) ................................................. 4, 5, 8
Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 236 P.3d 1277 (2010) ........................................... 4
Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 839 P.2d 1215 (1992) ................................... 3
State

v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (1989) ................................ .4

State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 90 P.3d 278 (2003) ......................................... .4
Statev. Nath, 141 Idaho 584,114 P.3d 142 (Ct. App. 2005) ............................... 6
State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355,247 P.3d 582 (2010) .................................. 7
State v. Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 253 P.3d 310 (2011) ....................................... 7
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) .................................................... 4
Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 164 P.3d 798 (2007) ..................................... 4

STATUTES
I.C. § 19-4906 ................................................................................................... 3, 4

RULES
I.C.R. 32 ............................................................................................................... 7
I.C.R. 33(c) ........................................................................................................... 6

ii

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Wendy Beighley appeals from the judgment entered upon the district
court's order dismissing her petition for post-conviction relief.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Wendy Beighley pleaded guilty to lewd conduct with a minor under
sixteen. (R., p. 31.) The district court sentenced Beighley to a term of 20 years
with seven years fixed.

(R., p. 31.)

Beighley appealed and filed a Rule 35

motion to reduce sentence. (R., p. 31.) The district court denied the Rule 35
motion, and the Court of Appeals affirmed both the sentence and denial of
Beighley's Rule 35 motion. (R., p. 31.)
Beighley filed a petition for post-conviction relief and supporting affidavit.
(R., pp. 1-8.) In her petition, Beighley asserted claims of ineffective assistance

of counsel, excessive sentence, and erroneous denial of her Rule 35 motion.
(R., p. 2.) The district court entered a notice of intent to dismiss the petition. (R.,

pp. 9-14.) Beighley responded with help from post-conviction counsel. (R., pp.
21-23, 28-29.) The district court dismissed Beighley's excessive sentence and
erroneous denial of Rule 35 motion claims.

(R., pp. 30-34.)

The state then

moved for summary judgment on Beighley's remaining claim for ineffective
assistance of counsel. (R., pp. 38-48.) After hearing counsel's argument on the
motion (but not taking evidence), the district court granted the state's motion.
(R., pp. 50-54.) Beighley timely appealed. (R., pp. 56-61.)
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ISSUES
Beighley states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Ms.
Beighley's claim that her attorney was ineffective for failing to move
to withdraw her guilty plea upon the State's breach of the plea
agreement?
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.)

The state rephrases the issue as:
Has Beighley failed to show the district court erred in summarily dismissing her
petition for post-conviction relief?
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ARGUMENT
Beighley Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Summarily Dismissing
Her Petition For Post-Conviction Relief
A.

Introduction
Beighley does not challenge the district court's dismissal of her excessive

sentence and denial of Rule 35 motion claims. (Appellant's brief, p. 1; R., p. 13
(these claims were already resolved on direct appeal.) In this appeal, Beighley
asserts the district court erred in concluding she failed to establish her trial
counsel was ineffective in failing to file a motion to withdraw her guilty plea.
(Appellant's brief, p. 6.) The record shows counsel was not ineffective, thus the
district court properly dismissed Beighley's claim.

B.

Standard Of Review
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the

appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801,807,839 P.2d 1215, 1221
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App.
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280
(Ct. App. 1986).

C.

Beighley's Petition Failed To State A Genuine Issue Of Material Fact
A claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal pursuant

to I.C. § 19-4906 "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of material
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fact" as to each element of petitioner's claims.

Workman v. State, 144 Idaho

518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007) (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); State v.
Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003). Although a court must
accept a petitioner's unrebutted allegations as true, it need not accept mere
conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or conclusions of
law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135
Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)).

Also, factual allegations that are

"clearly disproved by the record" are insufficient to support granting the relief
requested.

Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517, 521, 236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010)

(citation omitted). In this case, Beighley's petition claimed ineffective assistance
by trial counsel.

1.

An
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claim
Demonstration Of Deficient Performance And Prejudice

Requires

To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-conviction
petitioner must demonstrate both deficient performance and resulting prejudice.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau,
116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 (1989).

With respect to deficient

performance, a petitioner "must show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness."

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770,

787 (2011) (citations and quotations omitted).

In considering an ineffective

assistance of counsel claim, the courts apply "a strong presumption that
counsel's representation was within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance."

~
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To establish prejudice, a petitioner must show a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding
would have been different.

Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 787.

"A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."

kl

(citations and quotations omitted). "It is not enough to show that the errors had
some conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding."

kl

Rather,

"[c]ounsel's errors must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a
trial whose result is reliable."

2.

kl

Beighley Failed To Allege Facts Demonstrating She Was Entitled
To The Relief Requested

In her petition and supporting affidavit, Beighley asserted her trial counsel,
Faren Eddins, was ineffective by refusing to withdraw her guilty plea upon her
request. (R., pp. 3, 6.) However, Beighley never made such a request; Beighley
later clarified that while her appeal was pending, she attempted to contact
Eddins several times but was unsuccessful, thus acknowledging that Eddins did
not refuse to act upon her request. (R., p. 28.) Indeed, Beighley's response to
the notice of intent to dismiss her petition reflects that Eddins told Beighley's
post-conviction counsel he never received a request from Beighley to withdraw
her guilty plea. (R., p. 23.) Beighley failed to identify any supporting evidence
that she ever asked Eddins to withdraw her guilty plea.
As to her assertion she was unable to reach Eddins during the pendency
of her appeal, such allegation fails to establish deficient representation by
Eddins.

Beighley indicated that she attempted to contact Eddins about

withdrawing her plea only after her appeal was pending, when Eddins was no
5

longer Beighley's counsel of record. (R., p. 28.) Accordingly, Beighley did not
establish deficient performance or prejudice, and her ineffective assistance of
counsel claim was properly dismissed.
Further, even if Beighley had asked trial counsel to move to withdraw her
guilty plea before the appellate process, Beighley has shown no valid basis for
the district court to grant it.

A motion to withdraw guilty plea is governed by

I.C.R. 33(c), and requires a showing that withdrawal after sentencing is needed
"to correct manifest injustice," such as where such plea is entered involuntarily.
State v. Nath, 141 Idaho 584, 586-87, 114 P.3d 142, 144-45 (Ct. App. 2005)
(citing I.C.R. 33(c)). The record does not support that Beighley entered her plea
involuntarily, but that she simply received a harsher sentence than she expected.
(5/11/12 Tr. p. 8, Ls. 1-5.) Counsel will not be deemed ineffective for filing a
motion that would not have succeeded. See Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482, 492,
180 P.3d 521, 531 (Ct. App. 2009). Thus the record does not support that, had
Beighley made a timely request of trial counsel, his failure to move to withdraw
her guilty plea amounted to deficient performance.
In her petition, Beighley states, "there is a clear breach in [sic] of the plea
agreement."

(R., p. 3.)

However, the record supports no such breach.

Petitioner's response to the notice of intent to dismiss reflects that Beighley had
agreed to plead guilty to one count, and in exchange one count would be
dismissed. (R., p. 22; see 37799 R., p. 33.) Also, the state agreed it would not
object to a withheld judgment. (37799 R., p. 33.) Beighley acknowledges that
the state "did not expressly object to a withheld judgment." (Appellant's brief, p.
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9.) However, Beighley argues the state tacitly objected to a withheld judgment
by referring the district court to the recommendations in the presentence
investigation report, and asking the district court to weigh the information before
it appropriately. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-10.) Beighley cites no legal authority
that the state's closing comments are tantamount to a breach of plea agreement.
Nonetheless, Beighley asserts her trial counsel performed deficiently by not
objecting to the state's supposed breach.
Notably, defense counsel's decision whether to object and thus potentially
emphasize the state's subtle reference to the presentence investigator's
recommendation at sentencing is a tactical one.

A reviewing court will not

second-guess such decisions absent showing it was made due to "inadequate
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of
objective review." State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 382-83, 247 P.3d 582,
609-10 (2010).

Beighley has made no showing that trial counsel was

inadequately prepared, ignorant of the law, or otherwise fell short of performing
satisfactorily.

Indeed, examining a pre-sentence report and weighing its

information appropriately - as suggested by the state in its alleged breach - are
expected of the district court in rendering sentence.

See I.C.R. 32; State v.

Windom, 150 Idaho 873, 876, 253 P.3d 310, 313 (2011) (when an appellate
court reviews a sentence to determine if it was reasonable in light of the facts
and considering the objectives of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation,
and retribution or punishment).
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Given the strong presumption that counsel perform within an acceptable
range of reasonableness, Beighley has failed to raise a genuine issue of fact that
her trial counsel was deficient, or that prejudice resulted. Harrington, 131 S.Ct.
at 787.

Accordingly, Beighley did not establish her ineffective assistance of

counsel claim, and thus has not shown the district court erred in summarily
dismissing her post-conviction petition.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that the Court affirm the district court's
order summarily dismissing Beighley's post-conviction petition.
DATED this 31st day of July, 2013.

~~

Deputy Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 31st day of July, 2013, served a true
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy
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SPENCERJ.HAHN
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.

~~·
DAPJ.HlJANG
Deputy Attorney General
DJH/pm

8

